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Chapter Three 
Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle's 
Critique of Plato's Laws 
KEVIN M. CHERRY 
·ci<. 
Whether on matters of politics or physics, Aristotle's criticism of his pre-
decessors is not generally considered a model of charitable interpretation. 
He seems to prefer, as Christopher Rowe puts it, "polemic over accuracy" 
(2003, 90). His criticism of the Laws is particularly puzzling: It is much 
shorter than his discussion of the Republic and raises primarily technical 
objections of questionable validity. Indeed, some well-known commenta-
tors have concluded the criticisms, as we have them in the Politics, were 
made of an earlier draft of the Lt~ws and that Plato, in light of these criti-
cisms, revised the final version. 1 I hope to suggest, however, that these 
incongruities should lead us to look beyond Aristotle's explicit criticisms 
to an issue he also omits while discussing the Republic, namely, the char-
acter of philosophy and its place in political life. 
50 
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Before turning to examine the Laws itself, Aristotle makes a curious 
remark, often read as stating that Socrates is the principal philosopher of 
the Laws. 2 Discussing the differences between the Republic and the Laws, 
Aristotle says that "all the speeches of Socrates [nuvn~ ol -rou L:oKpu-rov~ 
Aoyot] are extraordinary; they are sophisticated, original, and searching 
[To ~YJTYjTtK6v]. But it is perhaps difficult to do everything finely" (Politics 
1265a10-13).3 
By referring to "all" the Socratic speeches, Aristotle is obviously in-
cluding more than one dialogue, and it is perhaps tempting to assume that 
he intends to include the Laws. Yet Aristotle never states that the Athenian 
Stranger is Socrates or that Socrates appears in the Laws. Indeed, given 
the context, Aristotle may well be contrasting Socrates and the Athenian. 
For what he finds most praiseworthy about the Socratic dialogues-their 
searching, or zetetic, character-seems to be wholly absent from the 
Laws. Sinclair and Saunders thus wonder whether Aristotle's reference is 
"an ironic joke, the ponderous lecturing being a poor replacement for the 
scintillating conversation of Socrates" (in Aristotle 1992, 120). 
What Aristotle suggests here is that there is a difference between 
Socrates and the Athenian, a difference that is as philosophic as it is po-
litical." While Aristotle's explicit account focuses on the political institu-
tions proposed by the Athenian, these criticisms bring us around to the 
philosophic dispute. That is, we must consider how zetetic the Athenian 
Stranger is. 
THE MIXED REGIME 
Aristotle is quite clear that neither the Republic nor the Laws offers proper 
guidance for political life, yet his Politics has far more in common with 
the institutions prescribed by the Athenian Stranger. This should not be 
surprising, for both emphasize learning from the successes, and more 
frequently failures, of other cities (e.g., Laws 691b-92c, 722b, 892de, 
968b; Politics V-VI). Unlike Plato's Socrates, the Athenian claims to have 
traveled extensively and engaged in the study of existing constitutions 
recommended by Aristotle at the conclusion of the Nicornachean Ethics 
(118la10 ff.), and he recommends that the rulers of the city do the same 
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and incorporate their own experiences into law (639d-e, 772b, 846c, 
95lbc, 957b).5 
Perhaps as a result of this shared reliance on political experience, 
both the Athenian Stranger and Aristotle recommend a mixed, or mod-
erate, regime. 6 There are, however, significant differences in how each 
understands such a mixture. Given the pious character of the Laws, it 
is unsurprising that the Athenian divinizes the argument for the mixed 
regime.7 He ascribes the development of the mixed regime in Sparta to 
a god (691d-92c, 691d8) and relies on a myth about the age of Kronos 
to justify the rule of law (713c ff.). 8 A god facilitated the development of 
a mixed regime in Sparta, allowing her to avoid the evils that befell her 
fellow cities, and the Athenian suggests that we need only learn from the 
god's work (692b-c).9 In the age ofKronos gods cared for human beings, 
and so we should recognize that in the absence of a god we must subor-
dinate our rulers to laws, the closest thing to the divine we have (714a). 
For the Athenian Stranger, the conflict between the various kinds of 
rule is ultimately irreconcilable.10 He identifies seven different claims to 
rule: that of parents over children, the well born over the not well born, 
the elder over the younger, masters over slaves, the strong over the weak 
(which elicits an enthusiastic affirmation from the Cretan Clinias, cf. 
625b-26c), the prudent over the ignorant (which the Athenian praises), 
and that of the lucky or, more charitably, the dear to the gods (690a-d). 
A lawgiver must somehow incorporate them all in order to avoid faction, 
the great evil in cities (628a-c). In determining what regime would be 
appropriate for their colony, the Athenian asks his Dorian counterparts 
whether they live in monarchies, tyrannies, democracies, oligarchies, or 
tyrannies. They are unable to answer, for they find elements of the differ-
ent kinds of regimes-save oligarchy-within their own. The Athenian 
is pleased, commenting that in most cities one part of the city enslaves 
the others (712c-13a). Therefore, their laws exist to benefit only a part 
of the city, and the city is divided into factions [crrctaLr..'rrYjc;]. Thanks to 
the intervention of the god, laws in the cities of Clinias and Megillus 
pursue "what is common to the whole city" (715b), and it is only cities 
such as these that are worthy of the name "regime" (713a). Indeed, all 
other cities-democracies, oligarchies, even monarchies-are, effec-
tively, nonregimes [oil no'Arrdctc;] (832b10).n Aristotle concedes that the 
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city described by the Athenian Stranger is indeed a polity, or regime 
[rro'Amictv] (1265b26-28). 12 
Aristotle alludes to this discussion in his own division of regimes in 
Book III of the Politics. He initially distinguishes regimes on the basis 
of whether they pursue the common or private good and the number of 
rulers, referring to the regime in which the multitude rules for the sake 
of the common benefit as the one that has "the name common to all 
regimes" [To JCotvov OVOfi.ct nct<rwv Twv no'Amtwv], that is, polity [no'Amict] 
(1279a38-39). This is an odd locution, of course, and has been the sub-
ject of much commentary, but in light of the Athenian's comment it 
makes perfect sense. The "polity," as Aristotle's mixed regime is gener-
ally translated, is described by him as the rule of the multitude for the 
common advantage. Due, however, to the limitations of the multitude-
most citizens are incapable of possessing the fullness of virtue-the pol-
ity achieves the common advantage only by incorporating the wealthy 
and virtuous alongside the multitude. Insofar as the polity attempts to 
secure the genuinely common advantage rather than the advantage of the 
many poor or few rich it meets the condition the Athenian sets out for 
being appropriately called a "regime." It is the regime that is, and should 
be, called regime. From Aristotle's perspective, it is the regime that most 
fully instantiates the character of political communities as communities 
of free and equal, though different, citizens, who alternate ruling and 
being ruled. 
Aristotle argues for the mixed regime on the basis of opinions about 
political equality advanced by oligarchs and democrats; ignoring either 
opinion would be not only destabilizing but also unjust (1280a9 ff., 
130la25 ff.). The virtuous contribute more to the city's higher, truest, 
end-that of living well or nobly-and so they have a "greater part" in 
ruling, but the wealthy and free do make contributions and so should 
have some, if a lesser, part (128la2-8). While the Athenian emphasizes 
the necessity of having checks on people in power and appeasing the 
many who would not be satisfied with the rule of the virtuous, Aristotle's 
case for the mixed regime is at least partially based on the positive con-
tributions made by different groups to the polis (128la40 ff., 1283a24 ff.; 
cf. 1309Bl6-19). By contrast, the Athenian's inclusion of democratic in-
stitutions such as the lot seems to be due only to the "necessity" fostered 
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by the many's refusal to accept "strict justice" rather than any contribu-
tion they make (757de). 
Aristotle agrees that reconciling the various claims to rule can be dif-
ficult, but he suggests the challenge is less formidable than the Athenian 
Stranger proposes. Some of the claims belong not in the polis, according 
to Aristotle, but rather the household, and others, he argues, are solved by 
nature. Whereas the Athenian suggests that the various claims to rule are 
"by nature opposed to one another," Aristotle instead asserts that nature 
helps solve this problem by distinguishing the young from the old (Laws 
690d2-3; Politics 1332b35 ff.). Young citizens, endowed with strength, 
are well suited for military service, which enables them to acquire the 
necessary experience of being ruled, as well as some familiarity with the 
advantageous and just, before they become rulers (1329a2 ff.). Later in life 
they will serve as priests, for it would be improper for anyone other than 
citizens to honor the gods (1329a26 ff.). The tensions within the mixed 
regime are less pronounced for Aristotle than for the Athenian Stranger.u 
THE RULE OF NOUS AND THE NOCTURNAL COUNCIL 
In order to avoid having one class ruling, the Athenian Stranger insists 
that the city ought to be ruled by "whatever within us partakes of im-
mortality, giving the name 'law' to the distribution ordained by intel-
ligence" (714a). It is difficult to see how the various offices within the 
city will reflect intelligence until the Athenian introduces the Nocturnal 
Council in Books X and XII. The Council comprises many of the most 
important officials in the city, and its ability to alter the laws (whether 
explicitly or, more likely, through interpretation) means that its mem-
bers, in fact, rule.14 The rule of law may be the closest parallel to the rule 
of nous, but nous comes to be in the laws only through the actions of the 
Nocturnal Council. As the Athenian says, once in place the Council will 
have the city turned over to it (969b). 
To be sure, the presence of philosophy is muted in the Laws. The 
word occurs only twice (857d2, 967c8).15 1hat is, at least in part, because 
the Athenian's interlocutors show little capacity for it. They do, however, 
show a willingness to accept it in their polis: Clinias accepts transcending 
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the laws in order to prove the existence of the gods, and the Athenian 
indicates that "unfamiliar arguments" will be necessary (89ld-e)-the 
very arguments to be studied by the Nocturnal Council (966e). This is 
not to suggest that all the members of the Council will be philosophers. 
Rather, it is to highlight the requirement that members of the Council 
receive an advanced education in order to pursue philosophical questions 
of a certain kind (818a), even if for practical purposes rather than the love 
and acquisition of wisdom (968c ff.). 16 Most citizens, by contrast, will ac-
cept these teachings almost as if they were slaves, without being able to 
explain them (966b, 967d-68a). 
As in the Republic, philosophy thus comes to rule in the city. 17 Both 
Socrates and the Athenian Stranger claim that rulers must philosophize 
if politics is to be successful (cf. Republic 473d) and that the city's institu-
tions must provide a place for philosophizing. Indeed, from Aristotle's 
perspective, the Athenian's reliance on philosophy is more problematic 
than that of Socrates, insofar as the Athenian turns the city over to phi-
losophy without saying so explicitly. Aristotle is skeptical of efforts to 
deceive the people (1297a7-10). 18 However, I would suggest that Aristotle 
also finds the content of the Athenian's philosophy more problematic 
than that of Socrates. 
As Catherine Zuckert has shown, the two investigations the Athenian 
Stranger assigns to the Nocturnal Council are ultimately incompatible 
(2009, 143-46). The first task described by the Athenian Stranger is to 
come to understand the nature of virtue: How is it both one and four-
that is, how is there "virtue" bur also courage, moderation, justice, and 
prudence (965d)? How does virtue relate to what is beautiful and good 
(966a)? 1hese inquiries point, of course, to the Socratic investigations 
recounted in Plato's dialogues, searching for the unchanging ideas. How-
ever, the Athenian also insists that the Nocturnal Council investigate 
the motion of the heavenly bodies on which he based his theology in 
Book X of the Laws. These bodies, as we shall see, are not only in con-
stant motion-and thus not unchanging-but also are, at least in part, 
in irregular motion. The Athenian's account points in both Socratic and 
pre-Socratic directions and is ultimately incoherent. 19 
Aristotle would doubt whether either of these inquiries is necessary 
or useful for statesmen. His criticism of the form or idea of the Good in 
56 Kevin M. Cherry 
the Nicomachean Ethics (1096all ff.) suggests that a similar knowledge 
of virtue, or the various forms it takes, might be equally unhelpful in 
helping us become virtuous. In addition to his own catalog of virtues in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle praises Socrates' sparring partner Gor-
gias for enumerating the variety, rather than investigating the unity, of 
the virtues (Politics 1260a24-28), particularly insofar as virtuous action 
differs for each kind of person (1259b18 ff.). It is not that virtue is un-
important for political life but rather that making people virtuous might 
not require philosophic knowledge of the virtues. 
The more critical error for Aristotle, I think, is the Athenian's em-
phasis on cosmology as the basis for political order. It is clear throughout 
the Laws that the Athenian's argument for the existence and providence 
of the gods is central to his enterprise. While it is Clinias who states that 
the proof of the gods' existence and providence would be the best and 
noblest [x:ct/J.LO"TOV TE x:cd apLO"TOV] of the preludes (887cl-2; cf. 726a ff., 
907dl-2), the Athenian does not disagree-and given the emphasis on 
piety throughout the dialogue, it is hard to see how he could. Aristotle, 
however, suggests that such knowledge might be unnecessary for, if not 
dangerous to, political life. In his treatment of the intellectual virtues 
in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, he draws a careful yet firm dis-
tinction between the virtues of phronesis and sophia. The former involves 
human action, that which can be otherwise, and it takes a variety of 
forms, including acting for one's own end as well as legislating for a city 
(1140al ff., 1141b23-34). Sophia, by contrast, is the most precise kind 
of knowledge insofar as it is directed at the highest objects (I 141a9 ff.) 
and seems to provide little guidance in the exercise of phronesis, which 
may be why people with experience often make better choices than those 
with wisdom. Popular views about the soul, for instance, are sufficient for 
guiding legislators in their effort to guide citizens to virtue. The prospec-
tive legislator must know that humans possess both rational and irratio-
nal parts of the soul, in order to employ both parts in leading citizens to 
virtue (NE 1102a18-26). He would not need to know what is argued in 
the De Anima, in which Aristotle denies that the soul is divided or even 
divisible (411b5 ff.; cf. NE 1102a30-31). 
Moreover, to base a political community on these arguments about 
the gods is to place politics on an unstable foundation, for Aristotle 
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emphasizes that, due to their distance from us, our knowledge of the 
heavenly bodies is, and must remain, uncertain.20 The best that we can 
do is offer arguments that are likely (e.g., De Caelo 286a3 ff., 291 b24 ff.). 
The Athenian Stranger also acknowledges this, indicating that his argu-
ment will go only so far as human power is capable of knowing these 
things (966c; cf. Timaeus 28c). Despite this, the Athenian proceeds as 
though the truth about the soul and the gods can be grasped on the 
basis of arguments that are not particularly difficult or lengthy (82Ie). By 
contrast, Aristotle contends that "in every way the soul is one of the most 
difficult things to get any assurance about" (De Anima 402all-12). 21 
ORDER AND DISORDER IN NATURE AND POLITICS 
The "unstable" foundation of a regime based on cosmology IS com-
pounded by the way in which the Athenian's inquiry into gods and soul 
reveals the universe to be at least partially disordered. The result of this is 
not only, as I noted earlier, a belief that the various claims to rule cannot 
be reconciled; it also implies a conception of nature that places human 
beings in a world that is at the very least unconcerned with human flour-
ishing, if not survival. 22 
The argument about divine providence that fills most of Book X of 
the Laws is primarily intended to show the existence and priority of soul 
over body (892a-c). The Athenian discusses several kinds of motion, but 
these seem to be reducible to two fundamental kinds: motion that is capa-
ble of moving others but not itself and motion capable of moving itself as 
well as others (894b). 23 The latter motion is obviously eldest and strongest, 
and such a motion must be characteristic of soul (894d-96a). Insofar as 
this motion must be first, soul must be prior and superior to body (896c). 
What is surprising is that the Athenian makes soul the cause of all the 
motions-"good and bad, noble and shameful, just and unjust"-that we 
see in the universe (896d). It is only when soul is joined with intelligence 
(nous) that it produces what we usually call good, for example, happiness 
and order, while it produces the opposite when it lacks intelligence (897b). 
The Athenian Stranger asserts that insofar as there are souls that 
possess every virtue, there must be gods, for what else could such souls 
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be (899b)?24 The argument continues to show that the gods display care 
[brq.dAEta-v] about human affairs, both great and small, because the gods 
could not lack any virtue, much less the knowledge necessary to order 
things (900d). The Athenian himself acknowledges that their argument 
is not entirely convincing and that some "mythic incantations" [en~6wv 
... ~-tt!9wv ht ·rwwv] are also necessary to persuade those who doubt the 
gods (903a-b; cf. 905d). However, while their myths assert that the gods 
"contrived" the universe so that virtue would triumph over vice, the 
Athenian compares the gods to doctors fighting disease or farmers faced 
with crop shortages (905e-6a). Such conflicts arise because heaven is full 
of both good and bad things, and, indeed, "there are more of the latter." 
The result is a universe characterized by "an immortal battle" [ft&XYJ ... 
a9ava-r6~] between good and evil (906a-b; cf. Statesman 273b-d). The 
gods may try to care for us, but their success is uncertain. Myths, there-
fore, are precisely what is necessary to convince the atheists of the sec-
ond and third, if not the first, truths about the gods-that they care for 
human beings and cannot be bribed (903a-b). 25 The arguments offered 
by the Athenian seem to be insufficient for this purpose. Aristotle would 
not be surprised: The divine beings, or gods, must, according to his argu-
ments, be uninterested in human life. 
The philosophic view that the cosmos is characterized by disorderly 
as well as orderly motion is evident throughout the Laws, and it has more 
significance than being incompatible with the investigation into the being 
of the various virtues. The Athenian, for instance, claims that "almost all 
human affairs are matters of chance," due to the frequency of "accidents 
of every sort," such as war, poverty, disease, or bad weather (709a-b).26 
The account of the origins of cities that he provides in Book III is equally 
suggestive of "many disasters," such as floods and plagues, that befall and 
periodically destroy almost all human beings ( 678e-79a). 27 1he Athenian's 
account of the universe places human beings in a precarious position. 
Rather than beginning from abstract, and problematic, specula-
tions about the gods, Aristotle instead begins, and believes philosophy 
should begin, with what is familiar to us and proceed from there (Physics 
184a16-21). 28 Nature for Aristotle is not the product of a divine crafts-
man (cf. Laws 967b), although it is sufficiently analogous that Aristotle 
frequently speaks of nature itself as a craftsman with respect to the way 
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that it regularly achieves its ends (e.g., Physics 199a12 ff.). Nature is suf-
ficiently consistent that it achieves its ends either always or for the most 
part (Physics 199al). Like the Athenian, Aristotle recognizes that there 
is disorder in the universe. Rather than posit a fundamental conflict be-
tween order and disorder, however, Aristotle suggests that the whole is, 
by and large, orderly and thus intelligible. 
Both the Athenian Stranger and Aristotle admit three possibilities 
with respect to motion: Either all things are in motion, all things are at 
rest, or some things are in motion and some at rest (Laws 893bc; Physics 
253a23 ff., 254a15 ff.). Both accept the last alternative, but Aristotle in-
dicates that this answer is inadequate. We also must learn whether those 
things in motion are always in motion and those things at rest always 
at rest, whether all things are capable of being in motion and at rest or 
whether some things are always in motion, some things are always at rest 
and others capable of rest as well as motion. Aristotle, of course, opts for 
the last of these, and what is noteworthy in light of the Athenian's argu-
ment is Aristotle's effort to show that, in addition to things always in 
motion, some things are always at rest (Physics 254b3 ff.). 
For Aristotle, that which is always at rest is the unmoved, or prime, 
mover. While the Athenian Stranger highlights soul as the first motion, 
Aristotle argues instead that the presence of something always in mo-
tion is reflective of the fact that there is something that causes motion 
without itself moving (Physics 257a27-32, 258b10-16; cf. Metaphysics 
107lb3-6).29 The unmoved mover moves other things not by moving 
itself but by being an object of desire and thought (Metaphysics 1071 b20, 
1072a26). In contrast to the views of the Athenian, this unmoved 
mover-which Aristotle identifies as god-is intellect, or thought, that 
thinks about only that which is "most divine and precious" without 
changing (1074b26). It contemplates itself and has no providential or 
creative purpose, nor does it possess the virtues (NE 1 178b7 ff.). 
In addition to arguing that motion depends on something that does. 
not move, Aristotle doubts whether the soul can properly be said to move 
at all, although it can effect change and thus cause motion in other be-
ings (De Anima 408b30 ff.). The highest characteristic of souls, Aristotle 
suggests, is the capacity to engage in thought (414b16-415a13) and thus 
achieve a higher level of perfection insofar as it more closely resembles the 
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activity of the unmoved, and unmoving, mover (Metaphysics 1072bl4 ff.). 
It is not humans but those beings which cannot be otherwise than they 
are, which exist unchanging and by necessity, that are by nature "most 
honorable" (NE 1139bl8-24, 114lb3). We exercise our highest capacities 
to their fullest in coming to know them. The stability of those beings 
leads to stability throughout the universe. 30 
In Book I of his Politics Aristotle begins with what is familiar and 
obvious to both citizens and philosophers. He emphasizes not abstract 
cosmological speculations but the orderly and hospitable character of 
nature we encounter every day. The polis, he famously (though not un-
controversially) asserts, exists by nature (1252b30), and we are by nature 
political animals (1253al-3). Indeed, he emphasizes that nature provides 
human beings with the capacity for reason and speech (logos) that makes 
political communities, to say nothing of human flourishing, possible 
(1253a14-19; De Anima 414a29 ff.). Moreover, according to Aristotle, 
what human beings need for their survival-such as food-is provided 
by nature (1256b15-23). Aristotle seems to be suggesting that the regular-
ity of nature, combined with the human ability to deliberate, enables us to 
make use of what is found in nature for the sake of our self-preservation. 
And at the end of the day, our ability to know these necessary and ever-
lasting beings through wisdom, the most precise and the most honored 
kind of knowledge, offers us the potential for the highest happiness (NE 
114lal7-20, 1179b8 ff.). Having indicated that truths about the soul are 
difficult, Aristotle, in his defense of the priority of the goods of the soul, 
refers to his other arguments about happiness (Politics 1323a21-23). 
PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 
For all his disagreement with the Athenian Stranger-and Socrates-about 
the nature and usefulness of philosophy, Aristotle only intimates such criti-
cisms in his Politics. One reason may be that for Aristotle philosophy does 
serve a purpose in politics, but it is a particular kind of philosophy: politi-
cal philosophy, the study of what is just, what is equal, in the context of 
the political (Politics 1282b20 ff.). This opens the door to philosophy in the 
full sense, but it is not philosophy in the full sense. Nor does it need to be, 
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for its truncated character means that more people can share in conversa-
tions about what is just and so share in the regime (1253al4-18). Political 
philosophy need not be the exclusive preserve of a few. 
This kind of philosophy is employed by Aristotle to resolve the con-
flict between the various claims to rule. Unlike those who would define 
oligarchs and democrats only on the basis of their wealth or poverty and 
would thus point, like the Athenian, to an irreconcilable division between 
them, Aristotle suggests that a more philosophic understanding reveals 
that these groups are truly distinguished on the basis of their opinions, 
however partial or incomplete, about justice and equality (1279bll ff.). 
Aristotle brings out in his Politics the numerous difficulties with trying 
to eliminate class tensions. A turn to the doxai, however, enables Aristotle 
to reconcile these political partisans by showing each group the partial 
truth about their opinions as well as the partial truth about their op-
ponents' opinions. An appreciation for the different contributions and 
claims could easily be reflected in the political institutions of a mixed re-
gime. Such a regime, which I take to be Aristotle's polity, would be more 
than a Rawlsian modus vivendi; it would represent a shared and mutual 
recognition of the contributions various groups make to the city. Only a 
philosophic understanding of politics which defines the partisans within 
the city on the basis of their opinion about justice enables those opinions 
to be reconciled and ameliorates the conflict between them. 
Insofar as Aristotle envisions philosophy playing a role in politics, he 
is unwilling to criticize explicitly Socrates or the Athenian Stranger for 
suggesting the same thing. Because he disagrees with the ways in which 
they employ philosophy in the city, however, he criticizes the institutions 
on which they rely to bring philosophy into the city and, more subtly, 
the kind of philosophy that characterizes those institutions. For instance, 
instead of examining the opinions about the various claims to rule in an 
attempt to reconcile them, the Athenian turns to divine providence to 
provide the necessary stability for the regime. The Athenian's arguments · 
for this are, however, exceptionally problematic: By making abstract 
cosmological speculations that undermine the order of nature, he places 
human life on shaky ground; by denying that there is anything stable and 
unchanging, he makes impossible what Aristotle identifies as the highest 
form of human activity. 
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From Aristotle's perspective, any sound investigation into the heav-
enly bodies must be not only humble and tentative-and thus unsuited 
as a foundation for politics-but also deeply rooted in the study of the 
natural world around us (e.g., De Caelo 268al, 298b2-3). It is only after 
investigating the physical world with which we are intimately familiar 
that we can develop the basic framework-such as teleology-necessary 
for trying to understand that which is far removed from our experience.31 
The Athenian's arguments proceed without any of this background. They 
seem, therefore, to be less an attempt at seriously understanding the uni-
verse than an attempt to foster adherence to the laws he and his interlocu-
tors have set down. They resemble, in short, "what modern thinkers call 
'ideology,' that is, the use of philosophically derived concepts and argu-
ments to support a specific political order" (Zuckert 2009, 143). While 
Socrates and the Athenian both err by making politics dependent on 
philosophy, Socratic philosophizing alone retains its zetetic character and 
is thus worthy of praise. 
NOTES 
1. See, e.g., Morrow 1960. 
2. Thomas Pangle claims "Aristotle (Politics 1265a12) identifies him as Socrates" 
(in Plato 1988, 511). Like Pangle, Leo Strauss suggests that the Athenian Stranger 
represents Socrates having fled his prison in Athens (1975, 2). Others suggest that the 
Athenian Stranger represents Plato's own mature views (e.g., Halverson 1997). 
3. Peter Simpson observes that while "Aristotle refrains from expressly naming 
Socrates in this chapter about the Laws (instead he uses 'he' or 'in the Laws' or some-
thing similar) ... he names Socrates many times in his preceding discussion of the 
Republic" (Simpson 1998, 93). In the same way, Aristotle never names-perhaps he 
could never name-the Eleatic Stranger of Plato's Statesman (e.g., Politics 1252a6-16, 
1289b5-6). 
4. Aristotle later combines the views of Socrates and the Athenian Stranger 
into those of Plato, arguing that Plato's originality consisted in "having in common 
women and children as well as property; and further the law concerning drinking 
... ; and also that aspect of military training which has them develop ambidexterity" 
(1274b10 ff.). 
5. Morrow (1993) argues that many of the Athenian Stranger's recommenda-
tions are variations of institutions found in Solonic Athens. Given Aristotle's praise, 
however qualified, of Solon (1273b25 ff.), it is unsurprising that there is significant 
overlap with the laws discussed by the Athenian. 
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6. This is at least the case with regard to the best attainable regime. Aristo-
tle's regime according to prayer in Books VII and VIII is an aristocracy insofar as it 
represents the rule of the best, but it is an aristocracy that includes a multitude of. 
rather than few, citizens. The Athenian Stranger acknowledges that he is legislating 
for human beings rather than children of gods, but he does not indicate what kind 
of regime such divine offspring would warrant, save for the community of women, 
children, and property (739a-c). 
7. The Athenian himself refers to their city as a "divine regime" [Seta~ noAmta~] 
(965c). 
8. Both the Athenian Stranger and Aristotle criticize and so correct the Spartan 
regime. The Athenian incorporates more of the Spartan model, perhaps due to the 
interlocutors with whom he is conversing and the colony he is helping to found in 
speech if not deed. Aristotle notes that someone-though perhaps not he himself-
could object to the Athenian's claim that his mixture is the second-best regime, pre-
ferring instead the Spartan or another more aristocratic regime. Might Aristotle here 
be referring to Socrates (Republic 545b ff.)? 
9. The Athenian Stranger acknowledges that humans, too, played a part in the 
Spartan mixture (691e2, 692a3), but he deemphasizes their role in his summary, as-
cribing it only to a god (692b6) and not mentioning Lycurgus. 
10. Jaffa (1963) argues that the central theoretical difficulty confronted by Aris-
totle in the Politics-the incommensurability of the various claims to rule-is re-
solved by the mixed regime and its inclusion of the multitude, which serves "as the 
formula for the commensuration of excellences different in kind" (113). 
11. Aristotle is rarely so explicit; he generally considers the deviant regimes to be 
"less regimes" and not nonregimes (1293b29). However, when discussing the mixture 
of"tyranny" and democracy in the Laws, Aristotle suggests first that they may not be 
regimes at all bur then only that they are the "worst" of regimes (1266a I ff.). 
12. Curiously, Aristotle will later fault, among others, Plato for failing to include 
polity in the enumeration of regimes (1293a42-b1). In the famous degeneration of 
regimes in the Republic, polity is not mentioned. 
13. One reason this may be so is that for Aristotle while the polis exists for the 
sake of living well, it comes into existence for the sake of living, and so those who 
contribute to that lower, yet still essential, end-through, for instance, military 
service-ought to have some share in ruling, even if their contribution to living well 
is negligible (1252b27-30). '!he Athenian, by contrast, argues that nothing should 
take priority to the acquisition of virtue, not even the defense of the city (770d-e). 
14. As is acknowledged by Simpson, who suggests that Aristotle's real reason for 
disagreeing with the rule of philosophers is that he believes "virtue can be found in 
the mass" (2003, 302). Lewis (1998b) persuasively argues that the Nocturnal Council 
does not undermine the regime outlined in the preceding books but rather meets 
some of its needs. 
15. Cf. Strauss, who idt:ntif!cs "the most philosophic, the only philosophic, part 
of the Laws" as the theology of Book X ( 1 'J75, 12')). 
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16. C£ Zuckert 2009, 138-39. 
17. Contending that Plato altered his preferred political views after the disastrous 
events of Syracuse (196-200), George Klosko insists that the Laws "more or less ex-
plicitly turns away from the ideal of the Republic." Its culmination in the rule of the 
"sinister sounding" Nocturnal Council that "recalls the Guardians of the Republic" 
thus requires explanation (Klosko 2006, 218, 236, 252), which Klosko suggests is due 
to Plato's death before completing revisions to the text (2008). Against this, see Lewis 
1998a, 1998b; Marquez 2011. 
18. The Athenian recognizes that not all officeholders will be virtuous, which is 
why the institutions of the audit and the scrutiny play such an important role. 
19. Lewis suggests that the Nocturnal Council, far from simply accepting the 
Athenian's argument, will instead pursue these questions as they best see fit (2009, 88). 
20. C£ Strauss's criticism of Thomistic natural law as "practically inseparable" 
from "natural theology" as well as the Bible (1953, 164). 
21. Aristotle's account of the heavenly bodies in De Caelo says little about the soul 
(the word ['fux~l occurs only three times, 284a27, 28, 32). 
22. The tension between the human good and "the observed, intelligible charac-
teristics of the universe" brought out by Plato in the Laws reflects the contemporary 
feeling that we are "adrift in a fundamentally indifferent, if not hostile environment" 
(Zuckert 2009, 145). Pangle, too, notes that the "problematic, if not disorderly, char-
acter of the relation between the human and the nonhuman ... places man much 
more at the mercy of indifferent or alien forces" (1976, 1076). 1he contrast with Aris-
totle, as I suggest above, is apparent. 
23. I follow Mayhew's commentary in reading the former of these as the genus 
of which the previously enumerated motions (893b-94b) are species (Mayhew 2008, 
117 ff.) 
24. Benardete contends that the Athenian Stranger "asserts that souls with com-
plete virtue are gods, but he never shows that such souls are, ... and he admits he does 
not know how they are and are causes (899b4-8)" (2000, 299). 
25. Pangle suggests that the Athenian's conception of a universe divided between 
good and evil will make for rich mythology among the citizens of Magnesia (1976, 
1076). 
26. The Athenian here connects chance and the gods. On the account in Book X, 
this would represent disorder and order, respectively (709bc). They are joined by a 
third thing, art, which is "gender" bur seems to be necessary in times of disorder. 
27. Such disasters reflect the disorder in the universe. By contrast, the relative 
ease of procuring food suggests the order in the universe (678e-79a). 
28. While Aristotle envisions priests in his city according to prayer, he says little 
about their duties and provides no specific theological doctrines save those useful 
to the city. Piety is not among the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Cf. Politics 
1328b11-13, 1335b12-16. 
29. Aristotle explicitly criticizes the Athenian's account in the Metaphysics, as-
serting that Plato errs by claiming that all things are in motion without identifying 
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the cause of this motion. Insofar as Plato conflates soul and the heavenly motions, he 
cannot point to a first cause: That which moves itself is not truly first (1071 b31-72a3). 
30. Bodnar and Pellegrin assert that Aristotle's account of the order found in the 
cosmos depends on "the causal influence of immutable entities" (2009, 270). 
31. See Leunissen 2010, chap. 6. 
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